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Abstract—This paper studies physical-layer secure transmis-
sions from a transmitter to a legitimate receiver against an
eavesdropper over slow fading channels, taking into account
the impact of finite blocklength secrecy coding. A compre-
hensive analysis and optimization framework is established
to investigate secrecy throughput for both single- and multi-
antenna transmitter scenarios. Both adaptive and non-adaptive
design schemes are devised, in which the secrecy throughput
is maximized by exploiting the instantaneous and statistical
channel state information of the legitimate receiver, respectively.
Specifically, optimal transmission policy, blocklength, and code
rates are jointly designed to maximize the secrecy throughput.
Additionally, null-space artificial noise is employed to improve
the secrecy throughput for the multi-antenna setup with the
optimal power allocation derived. Various important insights are
developed. In particular, 1) increasing blocklength benefits both
reliability and secrecy under the proposed transmission policy;
2) secrecy throughput monotonically increases with blocklength;
3) secrecy throughput initially increases but then decreases as
secrecy rate increases, and the optimal secrecy rate maximizing
the secrecy throughput should be carefully chosen in order to
strike a good balance between rate and decoding correctness.
Numerical results are eventually presented to verify theoretical
findings.
Index Terms—Physical-layer security, wiretap code, secrecy
throughput, finite blocklength, optimization.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the past decade, pursuing communication security at the
physical layer has received a considerable interest, e.g., [1]-
[7]. In particular, physical-layer security exploits the inherent
randomness of noise and wireless channels to protect wireless
secure transmissions [8]-[12], which can provide an additional
mechanism for security guarantee and can coexist with those
security techniques already employed at the upper layers,
such as key-based encipherment. Most recent progress in
developing physical-layer security is motivated by Wyner’s
pioneering work. Specifically, the concept of secrecy capacity
was first established which is defined as the supremum of
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secrecy rates at which both reliability and secrecy are achieved
over a wiretap channel [13]. Wyner showed that the error
probability and information leakage can be made arbitrarily
low concurrently with an appropriate secrecy coding, provided
that a data rate below the secrecy capacity is chosen and mean-
while the data is mapped to asymptotically long codewords,
i.e., the coding blocklength tends to infinity. However, the
upcoming 5G wireless communication systems are required
to support various novel traffic types adopting short packets
to reduce the end-to-end communication latency, e.g., smart-
traffic safety and machine-to-machine communications [14],
[15]. For the short-packet applications, conventional physical-
layer security schemes originated from infinite blocklength
are generally suboptimal and the impact of finite blocklength
could be destructive for secure communications. Therefore, it
is necessary to rethink the analysis and design of physical-
layer security for the finite blocklength regime.
A. Previous Works and Motivations
Decoding with finite blocklength will inevitably reduce the
secrecy capacity and some preliminary works have been de-
voted to analyzing the impact of finite blocklength on secrecy
for the wiretap channel. For example, the authors in [16]
derived an upper bound for the information leakage probability
for a given target decoding error probability demonstrating the
inherent trade-off between secrecy and reliability. The authors
in [17] provided both upper and lower bounds for the maximal
secrecy rate capturing the impact of finite blocklength, error
probability, and information leakage in both degraded discrete-
memoryless wiretap channels and Gaussian wiretap channels.
The obtained bounds were shown to be tighter than existing
ones from [18], [19]. The work in [17] was further extended by
[20], in which the optimal second-order secrecy rate was de-
rived for a semi-deterministic wiretap channel, and the optimal
tradeoff between secrecy and reliability with finite blocklength
was analytically characterized. It should be noted that, all
the above works were aimed to uncover the fundamental
limits of secrecy performance from the information theory
point of view, whereas the design of practical signaling and
transmission schemes were not investigated.
In practice, due to finite blocklength penalty for practi-
cal coding schemes, even a secrecy rate below the secrecy
capacity cannot guarantee a perfectly successful and secure
communication. In this sense, in addition to exploring and/or
improving the fundamental limits of the maximal secrecy rate,
optimizing secrecy throughput seems more important from the
2perspective of transmission efficiency, particularly for fading
channels where the code rates can be adapted to the fading
status. Herein, the secrecy throughput denotes the amount of
successfully delivered secret information subject to certain re-
liability and secrecy constraints. In fact, the secrecy throughput
has extensively been taken as an optimization objective for
the design of secure transmissions in slow fading channels in
the context of infinite blocklength [21]-[25]. Nevertheless, to
optimize the secrecy throughput under the constraint of finite
blocklength is difficult, and the results derived for infinite
blocklength, e.g., [21]-[25], cannot be directly applied. Indeed,
the blocklength itself is an optimization variable, and it couples
with other variables in a sophisticated manner which makes
the optimization problem intractable. For instance, the authors
in a recent work [26] investigated the secrecy throughput of a
relay-aided secure transmission with finite blocklength, where
neither the instantaneous channel state information (CSI) with
respect to (w.r.t.) the legitimate receiver nor the eavesdropper
is available at the transmitter side. Numerical results were
presented therein to show that there exists a critical value of
the blocklength that maximizes the secrecy throughput.
Despite the above endeavors, there are some fundamen-
tal questions regarding the design of physical-layer security
schemes with finite blocklength that have not been thoroughly
addressed. First of all, a theoretical proof of the optimal block-
length and the corresponding secrecy rate for maximizing the
secrecy throughput is of great significance for the practical de-
sign of secure transmissions, which however has not yet been
reported by existing literature. Also, in many applications,
the transmitter is capable to acquire the instantaneous CSI
of the legitimate receiver in slow fading channels via training
or feedback. Yet, the potential of exploiting the instantaneous
CSI to alleviate the negative impact of finite blocklength on the
performance of secure communications has not been exploited.
Furthermore, only the single-antenna transmitter scenario has
been considered, e.g., [16]-[20], [26], and the design of the
optimal signaling and code rates for multi-antenna systems
with finite blocklength is still an open issue. This research
work aims to provide an analytical framework and design
schemes to address the abovementioned problems.
B. Contributions
This paper investigates the security issue between a pair
of legitimate communicating parties in the presence of an
eavesdropper, considering the impact of finite blocklength in
secrecy coding. The secrecy throughput is thoroughly analyzed
and optimized for both single- and multi-antenna transmitter
scenarios. In particular, both adaptive and non-adaptive param-
eter design schemes are proposed for each scenario. The main
contributions of this work are summarized as follows:
• For the single-antenna transmitter scenario, the secrecy
throughput is maximized by jointly optimizing the trans-
mission policy, blocklength, as well as code rates. Closed-
form bounds and approximations for the secrecy rate are
provided to facilitate the practical design of code rates
for achieving a close-to-optimal performance.
• For the multi-antenna transmitter configuration, the op-
timality of the null-space artificial noise (AN) scheme
in terms of secrecy throughput maximization is first
investigated. Afterwards, the optimal transmission policy,
blocklength, code rates, and power allocation between
the information-bearing signal and the AN are derived.
Particularly, the power allocation and the secrecy rate
are designed via the alternating optimization method,
and their impacts on the system performance are further
revealed.
• Numerous useful insights into the design of secure
transmissions are provided with finite blocklength. For
example, 1) increasing the blocklength can improve both
reliability and secrecy, with properly exploiting the in-
stantaneous CSI of the main channel and the statistical
CSI of the wiretap channel, which has not been revealed
by existing literature, e.g., [16]-[20]; 2) using the max-
imal blocklength is profitable for boosting the secrecy
throughput, which is distinguished from the observation
in [26]; 3) due to the finite blocklength penalty, there
is a critical secrecy rate that can maximize the secrecy
throughput even for the adaptive scheme, rather than
always employing the maximal available secrecy rate,
which is fundamentally different from the phenomenon
with infinite blocklength, e.g., [21], [22].
C. Organization and Notations
The remainder of this paper is organized as below. Section II
describes the system model and the underlying optimization
problem. Sections III and IV detail the secrecy throughput
maximization for both single- and multi-antenna transmitter
scenarios. Section V draws a conclusion.
Notations: Bold lowercase letters denote column vectors.
| · |, ‖ · ‖, (·)†, (·)T, ln(·), P{·}, Ev[·] denote the absolute
value, Euclidean norm, conjugate, transpose, natural loga-
rithm, probability, and the expectation over a random variable
v, respectively. fv(·) and Fv(·) denote the probability density
function (PDF) and cumulative distribution function (CDF)
of v, respectively. F−1(·) denotes the inverse function of a
function F (·). CN (µ, σ2) denotes the circularly symmetric
complex Gaussian distribution with mean µ and variance σ2.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
A. Channel Model
Consider a secure transmission from a transmitter (Alice)
to a legitimate receiver (Bob) coexisting with an eavesdrop-
per (Eve), as depicted in Fig. 1. Alice is equipped with
M ≥ 1 transmit antennas, whereas Bob and Eve are single-
antenna devices. Quasi-static Rayleigh fading channels are
considered, where the channel coherence time is on the order
of the blocklength. More specifically, the fading coefficients
are assumed to remain constant during the transmission of
an entire codeword, but change independently and randomly
between two codewords [1]. Denote the coefficients of the
main and wiretap channels by hb and he, and each entry of
hb and he follow the Gaussian distribution CN (0, σ2b ) and
CN (0, σ2e), respectively.1 A common hypothesis is adopted
1The subscripts b and e are used to refer to Bob and Eve, respectively.
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Fig. 1: Secure transmission from Alice (multi-antenna) to Bob (single-antenna)
overheard by Eve (single-antenna). Alice adopts a wiretap code with a
binning structure, where 2nRs messages each are mapped to a bin of 2nRe
codewords with a finite blocklength n. A codeword among a set of codewords
representing the same message is randomly chosen for transmission [13].
[21], [22], i.e., Bob and Eve know perfectly the instantaneous
CSI of their individual channels hb and he, and Alice has the
instantaneous CSI of Bob’s channel hb but does not has the
instantaneous CSI of Eve’s channel he. Besides, the statistics
of both channels hb and he are available at Alice. Assume
that hb, he, and the receiver noise are mutually independent,
where noise variances at Bob and Eve are denoted by w2b and
w2e , respectively. Alice adopts a constant transmit power P .
For notational simplicity, define Pb ,
P
w2b
and Pe ,
P
w2e
as the
normalized power for Bob and Eve, respectively.
B. Finite Blocklength Secrecy Coding
To safeguard information confidentiality, secrecy coding
should be employed to encode the secret information bits.
Instead of investigating any explicit practical constructions of
secrecy codes, the Wyner’s wiretap code [13], as a generic
code structure, is employed in this paper. A synopsis of the
state-of-the-art coding schemes for wiretap channels can be
found in [27].
It is reported in [1] that the Wyner’s wiretap code possesses
a binning structure, as illustrated in Fig. 1, where 2nRs
messages are encoded to 2nRt codewords, and each message
is mapped to a bin of 2nRe codewords. Here, n denotes
the blocklength (i.e., the codeword length or the number
of channel uses), Rs and Rt (bits/s/Hz/channel) denote the
secrecy rate and codeword rate, respectively. The binning
codeword rate, i.e., the rate redundancyRe = Rt−Rs, reflects
the cost of providing secrecy.
It is well-known that, for an infinite blocklength with
n → ∞, as long as the codeword rate Rt is not larger
than Bob’s channel capacity, Bob can recover messages with
an arbitrarily low decoding error probability. On the other
hand, perfect secrecy cannot always be guaranteed due to the
absence of Eve’s instantaneous CSI: once the rate redundancy
Re falls below Eve’s channel capacity, perfect secrecy is
compromised, and a secrecy outage event is said to have
occurred. Nevertheless, in the finite blocklength regime which
is restricted to a finite number of channel uses, no practical
protocols can achieve perfectly reliable communications [28].
Hence, to capture the impact of finite blocklength, the maximal
channel coding rate for sustaining a desired decoding error
probability ǫ at a finite blocklength n (e.g., n ≥ 100) for a
given signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) γ was studied in [29] and
can be approximated by
R(γ, n, ǫ) ≈ C(γ)−
√
V (γ)
n
Q−1(ǫ), (1)
where C(γ) , log2(1 + γ) denotes the Shannon channel
capacity, V (γ) ,
(
1− (1 + γ)−2) log22 e denotes the chan-
nel dispersion [29], and Q(x) is the Q-function defined as
Q(x) , 1√
2π
∫∞
x
e−
t2
2 dt. Equivalently, the decoding error
probability for a given coding rate R can be expressed as
ǫ(γ, n,R) = Q
(
C(γ)−R√
V (γ)/n
)
. (2)
For ease of notation, let Ci , C(γi) and Vi , V (γi) for i ∈
{b, e}, where γi denotes the corresponding SNR. Define the
successful decoding probability of Bob as the complement of
its decoding error probability with the codeword rate Rt. Then,
the successful decoding probability conditioned on the power
gain of the main channel, i.e., η , ‖hb‖2, can be expressed
as
ps(η) , 1− ǫ(γb, n, Rt) = 1−Q
(
Cb −Rt√
Vb/n
)
. (3)
The secrecy performance is characterized by the information
leakage probability defined below:
Oe , Eγe [1− ǫ(γe, n, Re)] . (4)
Remark 1: Due to the finite blocklength, the secrecy metric
information leakage probability in (4) appears to be distin-
guished from the widely used secrecy outage probability,
defined as P{Re ≤ Ce} [22], for the infinite blocklength
regime with n→∞.
C. Optimization Problem
Since Alice knows Bob’s instantaneous CSI perfectly, she
is able to adapt the code rates to the instantaneous channel
gain η, which implies that the code rates can be functions of
η. This paper focuses on the metric named secrecy throughput
(bits/s/Hz/channel), which measures the average successfully
transmitted information bits per second per Hertz per channel
use subject to a secrecy constraint Oe ≤ δ, where δ ∈ [0, 1]
is a pre-established threshold for the information leakage
probability. Formally, the secrecy throughput is defined as
T , Eη [Rs(η)ps(η)] s.t. Oe ≤ δ, (5)
which is averaged over η. Note that the introduction of finite
blocklength leads to a different definition of secrecy through-
put compared to the case of infinite blocklength which is
T , Eη [Rs(η)] [21], [22]. In addition, as will be shown later,
in order to meet certain secrecy and reliability requirements
during the transmission period, an on-off transmission policy
4is required;2 i.e., the transmission should take place only when
the channel gain η exceeds some threshold µ > 0. With the
on-off policy, Rs(η) is set to zero for η < µ.
This paper aims to maximize the secrecy throughput by
designing the optimal on-off threshold, signaling, blocklength,
as well as code rates. The following two sections will detail
the optimization for single- and multi-antenna transmitter sce-
narios, respectively. For each scenario, both adaptive and non-
adaptive design schemes are examined, where Alice adjusts
the arguments based on the instantaneous and statistical CSI
of the main channel, respectively.
III. SINGLE-ANTENNA TRANSMITTER SCENARIO
For the single-antenna transmitter scenario, the SNRs of
Bob and Eve are given by γb = Pbη with η = |hb|2
and γe = Pe|he|2, respectively. Clearly, γi is exponentially
distributed with mean Γi = Piσ
2
i for i ∈ {b, e}. The
subsequent two subsections aim to maximize the secrecy
throughput T defined in (5) by jointly designing the on-off
threshold µ(η), the wiretap code rates Rs(η) and Re(η), and
the blocklength n(η), via adaptive and non-adaptive ways,
respectively. For notational convenience, these parameters are
treated as functions of η by default for the adaptive scheme,
with the notation η being dropped, and TA and TN are
used to differentiate the adaptive scheme to its non-adaptive
counterpart. The optimization problem then can be formulated
as below:
max
µ>0,Re>0,Rs>0,n
T = Eη [Rsps] (6a)
s.t. Cb ≥ Rt = Rs +Re, ∀η > µ, (6b)
Oe ≤ δ, (6c)
1 ≤ n ≤ N, n,N ∈ Z+. (6d)
Note that (6b) is interpreted as a reliability requirement since
otherwise the successful decoding probability ps in (3) falls
below 0.5 and it is no better than random guessing, which is
definitely not acceptable; (6c) describes the secrecy constraint;
(6d) is related to a latency constraint, where the integer
N denotes the maximal available blocklength imposed by a
maximal tolerable delay.
A. Adaptive Optimization Scheme
In the adaptive scheme, the parameters µ, Rs, Re, and n
are designed based on η, i.e., they are adjusted in real time.
A detailed optimization procedure is provided as follows.
1) Solving Re: Since Q-function Q(x) is a monotonically
decreasing function of x, it is known that ps defined in (3)
decreases with Re for a fixed Rs. This suggests that, the
optimal Re maximizing TA should be the minimal Re that
satisfies the secrecy constraint Oe ≤ δ. Now that Oe in (4)
decreases with Re, the optimal Re is given as the inverse of
Oe at δ, i.e.:
R∗e = O−1e (δ). (7)
2The on-off policy was initially proposed for ergodic-fading channels
[30], where a codeword experiences many channel realizations. It was later
introduced to slow fading channels and well characterized the condition for
secure transmissions [21].
Obviously, R∗e is independent of η, but monotonically de-
creases with δ. This is intuitive that a larger rate redundancy
is required to combat the eavesdropper in order to meet a
more rigorous secrecy constraint. Although it is difficult to
derive a closed-form expression for R∗e due to the complicated
Q-function, the value of R∗e can be efficiently acquired via
a bisection method with Oe(Re) = δ, requiring only the
computation of Q(x) or a lookup table.
2) Solving µ: The secrecy throughput TA given in (6a) can
be calculated as
TA =
∫ ∞
Pbµ
Rspsfγb(γ)dγ, (8)
where fγb(γ) =
1
Γb
e−γ/Γb is the PDF of γb = Pbη. It appears
that choosing µ as small as possible is beneficial for increasing
TA, on the premise of satisfying the reliability constraint (6b).
In addition, constraint (6b) suggests that Cb > R
∗
e ⇒ η =
γb
Pb
> 2
R∗e−1
Pb
must be ensured to achieve a positive Rs. Hence,
the optimal on-off threshold is given by
µ∗ =
2R
∗
e − 1
Pb
. (9)
This result indicates that the transmission condition for the
adaptive scheme is determined by the secrecy constraint.
Apparently, µ∗ is monotonically decreasing with δ since R∗e
decreases with δ. This implies, a weaker channel is still
allowed for transmission for a looser secrecy constraint.
Once µ is obtained, to maximize TA in (8) only calls for
maximizing TA(η) , Rsps which is conditioned on η. The
subproblem is described as below:
max
Rs,n
TA(η) = Rsps s.t. (6d), 0 ≤ Rs ≤ Cb −R∗e . (10)
The basic idea to tackle the above problem is first to maximize
ps over n for a fixed Rs and then to design the optimal Rs
that maximizes Rsps with the optimal n.
3) Solving n: For any fixed Rt ≤ Cb, there is no doubt that
ps increases with n. However, as shown in (4), ǫ(γe, n, Re)
decreases with n for Re ≤ Ce but increases with n otherwise.
Then, it remains unclear how Oe defined in (4), as well as R∗e
in (7), varies with n. More importantly, it is less obvious if the
monotonicity of ps w.r.t. n can still hold, since Rt = Rs+R
∗
e
becomes independent of n. Therefore, in order to derive the
optimal n∗ maximizing TA(η) in (10), the monotonicity of Oe
or R∗e w.r.t. n should be first identified.
Lemma 1: Oe in (4) and R∗e in (7) decrease with n.
Proof 1: Please refer to Appendix A.
Lemma 1 shows that increasing the blocklength is beneficial
for decreasing the information leakage probability such that
the required rate redundancy of the wiretap code can be
lowered. This result is perhaps counter-intuitive, which makes
sense when one realizes that a larger blocklength will yield
a larger decoding error probability for Eve if Eve’s channel
capacity falls below the rate redundancy. With Lemma 1, the
monotonicity of TA(η) w.r.t. n is uncovered, followed by the
optimal n∗ that maximizes TA(η).
Theorem 1: TA(η) in (10) increases with n and is maximized
at n∗ = N .
5Proof 2: Please refer to Appendix B.
Theorem 1 reveals that exploiting a larger blocklength is
beneficial for improving the secrecy throughput under given
channel gains. This result is nontrivial in light of [26] where
there exists a critical value of the blocklength, instead of
the maximal one, that can achieve the maximal secrecy
throughput. The main reason behind the two different results
lies in that, Bob’s instantaneous CSI is available here and is
adequately exploited, and the codeword rate will not exceed
Bob’s channel capacity under the on-off policy such that using
a larger blocklength can always lower the decoding error
probability for Bob. Combined with Lemma 1, it can be seen
that increasing the blocklength improves reliability and secrecy
simultaneously, thus making the secrecy throughput higher.
However, this can no longer be promised in [26] where the
instantaneous CSI of the main channel is unknown, and using
a larger blocklength might degrade the reliability once the
codeword rate exceeds Bob’s channel capacity, just as implied
in Lemma 1. Revisiting (8), since µ∗ in the lower limit of the
integral decreases with n (see (9) where R∗e decreases with n),
it is clear that the global optimal blocklength that maximizes
TA is also n∗ = N .
4) Solving Rs: Substituting the derived optimal R
∗
e , µ
∗,
and n∗ into (3) yields the maximal ps, and then the optimal
R∗s can be determined by solving the following problem:
max
Rs
TA(η) = Rs
[
1−Q
(
Cb −Rs −R∗e√
Vb/N
)]
(11a)
s.t. 0 < Rs ≤ Cb −R∗e . (11b)
Theorem 2: TA(η) in (11) is a concave function of Rs, and
its maximal value is achieved at
R∗s =
{
Cb −R∗e , η ≤ γ
◦
b
Pb
,
R◦s , otherwise,
(12)
where γ◦b ∈
(√
1
2 +
√
1
4 +
π
2N − 1, e
√
pi
2N +R
∗
e ln 2 − 1
)
is
the unique root γb > 0 that satisfies Cb −
√
πVb
2N = R
∗
e , and
R◦s is the unique zero-crossing Rs < Cb−R∗e of the derivative
dTA(η)
dRs
= 1−Q
(
Cb −Rs −R∗e√
Vb/N
)
−Rs
√
N√
2πVb
e
− (Cb−Rs−R
∗
e)
2
2Vb/N .
(13)
Proof 3: Please refer to Appendix C.
Theorem 2 presents an optimal secrecy rate R∗s that differs
from the one for infinite blocklength with N → ∞, where
in the latter employing the maximal achievable secrecy rate
R∗s = Cb − R∗e is always optimal for secrecy throughput
improvement. The fundamental reason behind such difference
lies in the decoding failure caused by finite blocklength.
Specifically, when the quality of the main channel is poor (i.e.,
a small η) or when a large rate redundancy R∗e is required,
e.g., due to a high average SNR of Eve or a stringent secrecy
requirement, the successful decoding probability ps is initially
small and decreases slowly with Rs. In this case, the secrecy
throughput improvement is mainly bottlenecked by Rs, and
hence it is necessary to choose the maximal secrecy rate
R∗s = Cb−R∗e . Otherwise, ps is initially large but drops rapidly
with Rs, thus dramatically degrading the secrecy throughput.
Therefore, a relatively small Rs is supposed to be chosen to
strike a good balance between the decoding and throughput
performance.
The optimal secrecy rate R∗s ≤ Cb − R∗e in (12) can be
obtained efficiently using the Newton’s method, despite its
implicit form. The following corollaries further give a closed-
form asymptotically tight lower bound RLs on R
∗
s and provide
useful insights into the behavior of R∗s .
Corollary 1: The optimal secrecy rate R∗s in (12) satisfies
R∗s ≥ RLs , Cb −R∗e −
√√√√2Vb
N
ln
(
1
2
+
Cb −R∗e√
2πVb/N
)
. (14)
Proof 4: The result follows by finding a lower bound on
dTA(η)
dRs
in (13) applying the inequalities Q(x) ≤ 12e−x
2/2 and
Rs ≤ Cb − R∗e and then setting the resultant lower bound to
zero.
The term
√
2Vb
N ln
(
1
2 +
Cb−R∗e√
2πVb/N
)
in (14) is interpreted as
the secrecy rate loss arisen from finite blocklength. This term
vanishes as N → ∞ or R∗e → Cb −
√
πVb
2N , and accordingly
R∗s approaches Ce−R∗e . In this sense, the lower bound RLs can
be employed as a computational convenient alternative to the
optimal R∗s , particularly for the large blocklength scenarios.
Corollary 2: The optimal secrecy rate R∗s monotonically
increases with the channel gain η.
Proof 5: It is proved that
Cb−Rs−R∗e√
Vb
in (13) increases with
η such that dTA(η)dRs increases with η. Then, using the derivative
rule for implicit functions with
dTA(η)
dR∗s
= 0 reaches
dR∗s
dη > 0.
Fig. 2 depicts secrecy throughput TA(η) versus secrecy
rate Rs for different blocklength N and channel gain η. The
concavity of TA(η) on Rs given by Theorem 2 is well verified.
Specifically, TA(η) first increases and then decreases with Rs,
and there exists an optimal R∗s that maximizes TA(η). It is also
found that TA(η) almost linearly increases with Rs at first,
since the throughput loss due to decoding error is negligible.
Note that the curves in the figure are cut in different points
which represent different values of the maximal achievable
secrecy rate Rmaxs for different N and η, and it is obvious that
Rmaxs increases with N and η. As η grows, TA(η) improves
significantly and the corresponding optimal R∗s increases,
which validates Corollary 2. The underlying reason is that,
when the main channel quality improves, choosing a larger
Rs contributes more to improving TA(η) compared with
increasing the successful decoding probability ps (by lowering
Rs). In addition, as proved in Theorem 1, TA(η) increases with
N . It is also proved that the optimal R∗s increases with N as
η → ∞. However, it is no longer true when η is too small,
e.g., η = 3 dB. This is because, for a low channel quality,
the decoding performance becomes a key restricting factor on
throughput improvement, and hence Rs should be decreased
to ensure a large ps as N increases. Moreover, the secrecy
throughput obtained with the lower bound RLs in Corollary
1 approaches closely the optimal one particularly when N is
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0
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Fig. 2: TA(η) vs. Rs for different N and η, with Pb = 0 dB, Γe = 0 dB,
and δ = 0.2.
sufficiently large, which demonstrates the usefulness of the
lower bound.
B. Non-Adaptive Optimization Scheme
This section devises a non-adaptive optimization scheme
where the parameters µ, Rs, Re, and n are designed based on
the statistical CSI of the main channel and remain unchanged
during the transmission period. Such a non-adaptive scheme
can be computed off-line, which significantly lowers the
complexity compared with an adaptive one.
Since all the parameters are independent of the channel gain
η, the problem of maximizing the secrecy throughput in (5)
can be recast as follows:
max
µ,Re,Rs,n
TN = Rsp¯s s.t. (6b)− (6d), (15)
where p¯s =
∫∞
Pbµ
psfγb(γ)dγ denotes the average successful
decoding probability.
The above problem can be handled via similar steps for its
adaptive counterpart in Sec. III-A. To begin with, in order
to increase ps for a given Rs, a minimal rate redundancy
Re should be chosen while satisfying the secrecy constraint
Oe ≤ δ. Hence, the optimal R∗e is given in (7). It can be
inferred from (15) that a smaller transmission threshold µ can
produce a larger TN. Nonetheless, Cb ≥ log2(1 + Pbµ) ≥
Rs+R
∗
e must be ensured, since otherwise there would always
exist a transmission initiated when η > µ while violating the
reliability constraint (6b). Consequently, the optimal µ∗ for a
fixed Rs is given by
µ∗ =
2Rs+R
∗
e − 1
Pb
. (16)
Note that in order to support a constant secrecy rate Rs, the
optimal on-off threshold µ∗ for the non-adaptive scheme is
generally larger than that of the adaptive one as given in (9).
On the other hand, the optimal µ∗ monotonically decreases
with δ and n, which is similar to the adaptive case. That is to
say, the transmission condition can be relaxed when facing a
looser secrecy requirement or using a larger blocklength.
Substituting R∗e and µ
∗ into p¯s and invoking the approxi-
mation of Q-function in (49) yields
p¯s =
∫ ∞
Pbµ∗
[1− Ξ(γb, n, Rs +R∗e)] fγb(γ)dγ
(a)
= 1−Fγb(θ2b )
∫ τub
θ2b
(
1
2
− β
θb
(γ − θ2b )
)
fγb(γ)dγ
(b)
= 1− 1
2
Fγb(θ2b )−
β
θb
∫ τub
θ2b
Fγb(γ)dγ, (17)
where (a) is due to θb =
√
Pbµ∗ =
√
2Rs+R
∗
e − 1, β =
√
n
2π ,
and τub = θ
2
b +
θb
2β , and (b) stems from the use of partial
integration. With (17), the problem of maximizing TN over n
and Rs can be equivalently transformed as below:
max
β,θb
TN =
[
log2(1 + θ
2
b )−R∗e
]
p¯s (18a)
s.t.
1
2π
≤ β ≤
√
N
2π
, θb >
√
2R
∗
e − 1. (18b)
Theorem 3: TN in (18) is a monotonically increasing func-
tion of β or n.
Proof 6: The result follows by proving that
dTN
dβ
= −dR
∗
e
dβ
p¯s +
[
log2(1 + θ
2
b )−R∗e
] dp¯s
dβ
(a)
>
[
log2(1 + θ
2
b )−R∗e
] dp¯s
dβ
(b)
> 0, (19)
where (a) is due to
dR∗e
dn < 0 from (51), and (b) follows from
dp¯s
dβ =
1
θb
∫ τub
θ2b
[Fγb(τub )−Fγb(γ)] dγ > 0 as Fγb(γ) is an
increasing function of γ.
Theorem 3 suggests that Alice should use the maximal
blocklength to maximize the secrecy throughput for the non-
adaptive scheme, regardless of other parameters, i.e., the
globally optimal blocklength is n∗ = N . More importantly,
this conclusion holds for any distribution of γb.
Substituting the CDF Fγb(γ) = 1− e−γ/Γb into (17) yields
TN = 1
2
[
log2(1 + θ
2
b )−R∗e
]
[1 + Y (θb)] e
− θ
2
b
Γb , (20)
where Y (θb) =
2βΓb
θb
(1 − e−
θb
2βΓb ) > 0. The optimal θ∗b that
maximizes TN is provided below.
Theorem 4: TN in (20) is first-increasing-then-decreasing
w.r.t. θb; the optimal θ
∗
b maximizing TN is the unique root
θb >
√
2R
∗
e − 1 of G(θb) = 0, where G(θb) is a decreasing
function of θb:
G(θb) =
1 + Y (θb)
ln 2
− [log2(1 + θ2b )−R∗e] 1 + θ2bθb g(θb),
(21)
with g(θb) =
(
1
2θb
+ 14βΓb +
θb
Γb
)
Y (θb) +
θb
Γb
− 12θb .
Proof 7: Please refer to Appendix D.
Based on Theorem 4, the optimal θ∗b or secrecy rate R
∗
s =
log2(1 + (θ
∗
b )
2) − R∗e can be efficiently calculated using a
bisection search with G(θb) = 0, and thus the maximal T ∗N can
be obtained from (18). The following corollaries demonstrate
7the behavior of R∗s w.r.t. to the average channel power gain
σ2b =
Γb
Pb
and provide a closed-form approximation of R∗s at
the large σ2b regime.
Corollary 3: The optimal R∗s monotonically increases with
σ2b .
Proof 8: Following similar steps as the proof of Theorem
4, it can be verified that G(θb) in (21) increases with σ
2
b such
that
dR∗s
dσ2b
= − ∂G(θb)/∂σ2b∂G(θb)/∂R∗s > 0, which completes the proof.
Corollary 3 suggests that a larger secrecy rate should be
employed to boost the secrecy throughput when the quality
of the main channel improves, despite the fact that it might
deteriorate the decoding correctness at Bob.
Corollary 4: At the regime of σ2b →∞, the optimal secrecy
rate R∗s is approximated by
R∗s ≈ RAs = log2(e)W0
(
σ2b2
−R∗e
)
≈ log2(σ2b )−R∗e − log2
[
ln(σ2b )−R∗e ln 2
]
, (22)
whereW0(x) is the Lambert’sW function [38, Sec. 4.13] that
satisfies x =W0(x)eW0(x).
Proof 9: It is clear that Y (θb) → 1 and g(θb) → 2θbΓb
as σ2b → ∞. Substituting the results into (21) with θ2b =
2Rs+R
∗
e − 1 and letting G(θb) = 0 produce the first approxi-
mation. The second approximation comes from the expansion
of W0(x) as x→∞ that W0(x) ≈ lnx− ln(lnx).
Fig. 3 plots the secrecy throughput TN versus the secrecy
rate Rs for different values of the blocklength N and the
average channel gain σ2b . It can be seen that TN first increases
and then decreases with Rs, which validates Theorem 4. The
optimal R∗s maximizing TN increases with σ2b , which verifies
Corollary 3 well, and the reason behind is similar to that for
Corollary 2. It can also be observed that the optimal R∗s is
almost impervious to different N . This is because, the optimal
secrecy rate for the non-adaptive scheme only depends on
the average successful decoding probability, and the averaging
process softens the impact of the blocklength. Theorem 3 is
also confirmed, where it is found that TN increases with N .
In addition, the secrecy throughput with the approximate RAs
obtained in Corollary 4 is almost coincided with that of the
optimal R∗s , which demonstrates the practicability of the low-
complexity approximation.
Fig. 4 compares the secrecy throughput for adaptive and
non-adaptive schemes with different blocklength N . The left-
hand-side figure depicts the maximal secrecy throughput T ∗,
where T ∗A for the adaptive case improves as N increases
whereas T ∗N for the non-adaptive case almost remains un-
changed. When the average channel gain σ2b increases or
the secrecy constraint becomes relaxed (i.e., a larger δ), the
maximal T ∗ for both schemes improves significantly, and the
gap T ∗A − T ∗N increases. The right-hand-side figure illustrates
the relative throughput gain ∆T , T ∗A−T ∗NT ∗N which reflects
the superiority of the adaptive scheme over its non-adaptive
counterpart. It is shown that ∆T grows dramatically with N
but decreases with σ2b and δ. This suggests that the adaptive
scheme is more preferred for some unfavorable scenarios,
e.g., with a large blocklengh (large delay), a poor channel
quality, or a stringent secrecy requirement; otherwise, the non-
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adaptive scheme could be an alternative choice owing to its
low implementation complexity.
IV. MULTI-ANTENNA TRANSMITTER SCENARIO
When Alice is equipped with multiple antennas, she can in-
tentionally transmit AN together with the information-bearing
signal to degrade Eve’s channel quality. Generally, the null-
space AN scheme, in which the AN is injected uniformly
in directions orthogonal to the main channel, is heuristically
employed in the context of infinite blocklength [33]. The near-
optimality of AN in terms of improving secrecy capacity for
the multi-input single-output wiretap channel was first proved
in [34] from a rigorous information-theoretic perspective, and
its degraded performance was later observed for the multi-
input multi-output wiretap channel [35]. On the other hand, it
was argued in [36] that distributing a certain proportion of AN
in the direction of main channel can surprisingly gain a larger
ergodic secrecy rate. When it comes to finite blocklength, since
8decoding failure might occur even when the codeword rate lies
below the channel capacity, which is quite different from the
infinite blocklength case, it is still unclear whether the null-
space AN is optimal and how the optimal power allocation
of the AN scheme should be determined for maximizing the
secrecy throughput. To this end, this section focuses on the
optimization of secrecy throughput with finite blocklength for
the multi-antenna scenario, where the optimality of the null-
space AN scheme will be identified first.
Considering a general scenario where the AN is not re-
stricted to be orthogonal to the main channel, Alice’s trans-
mitted signal can be constructed in the form of
x =
√
φPw
(√
αs+
√
1− αv)+
√
(1 − φ)P
M − 1 W⊥z, (23)
wherew =
h
†
b
‖hb‖ denotes the beamforming vector for the main
channel, W⊥ denotes theM×(M−1) projection matrix onto
the null space of hb such that h
T
b W⊥ = 0, and the columns of
[w W⊥] constitute an orthogonal basis; s, v, and z denote the
information signal, the AN in the direction of w, and the AN
in the null space W⊥, with each element obeying CN (0, 1);
φ ∈ [0, 1] represents the fraction of the total transmit power
P allocated to the direction of w, and α ∈ [0, 1] represents
the power allocation ratio of the information signal to φP .
With (23), the received signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratios
(SINRs) at Bob and Eve are respectively
γb =
αφPbη
(1 − α)φPbη + 1 , (24)
γe =
αφPe|hTe w|2
(1 − α)φPe|hTe w|2 + (1−φ)Pe‖h
T
e W⊥‖2
M−1 + 1
, (25)
where η = ‖hb‖2. The successful decoding probability ps
and the information leakage probability Oe for the multi-
antenna case are still given by (2) and (4), respectively. The
corresponding secrecy throughput optimization problem can
be formulated as below:
max
µ,Re,Rs,n,α,φ
T = Eη [Rsps] s.t. (6b)− (6d), 0 ≤ α, φ ≤ 1.
(26)
The following subsections will first detail the optimization
procedure for both adaptive and non-adaptive schemes, and
then briefly discuss the scenario of a multi-antenna Eve.
A. Adaptive Optimization Scheme
This subsection optimizes the secrecy throughput TA by
designing the parameters involved in problem (26) adaptively
according to the instantaneous channel realization hb.
1) Solving Re: Similar to the single-antenna case, the
optimal rate redundancy is given by R∗e = O−1e (δ) with Oe
in (4). Note that R∗e herein is a function of φ and α.
2) Solving α: Resort to a function κ(x, α) , xαx(1−α)+1
defined in [37], which increases with x for α > 0. Then,
the SINRs γb in (24) and γe in (25) can be reformulated
as γb(φ, α) = κ (γb(φ, 1), α) and γe(φ, α) = κ (γe(φ, 1), α).
Define Φe(φ, α) , 2
R∗e−1 as the SINR threshold for γe(φ, α)
such that R∗e = log2(1 + Φe(φ, α)). Recalling the secrecy
constraint Oe(Φe; θ, α) = δ, Φe(φ, α) is the δ-upper quantile
of γe(φ, α) such that it also follows the form Φe(φ, α) =
κ(Φe(φ, 1), α) [37]. Hence, the condition for guaranteeing a
positive secrecy rate is described as
γb(φ, α) > Φe(φ, α)⇒ κ(γb(φ, 1), α) > κ(Φe(φ, 1), α)
⇒ γb(φ, 1) > Φe(φ, 1)
(a)⇒ ρb > ρe(φ), (27)
where ρb , Pbη, ρe(φ) ,
Φe(φ,1)
φ , and (a) is due to γb(φ, 1) =
φPη. Then, the threshold µ can be simply set as µ(φ) =
ρe(φ)
Pb
for any fixed φ. Revisiting (8), since µ(φ) is independent
of α, the optimal α∗ that maximizes TA can be obtained by
maximizing TA(η) = Rsps, where ps is defined in (3) and
can be rewritten as
ps = 1−Q
(
√
nλb
lnλb − lnλe −Rs ln 2√
λ2b − 1
)
, (28)
with λb , 1 + κ(γb(φ, 1), α) > λe , 1 + κ(Φe(φ, 1), α) > 1.
Although it is difficult to see how ps varies with α for a fixed
Rs < log2
λb
λe
as both λb and λe increase with α, the following
theorem provides the optimal α∗ that maximizes TA.
Theorem 5: α∗ = 1 is optimal for maximizing the secrecy
throughput TA.
Proof 10: Please refer to Appendix E.
Theorem 5 suggests that there is no need to inject the
AN in the main channel direction for secrecy throughput
improvement with finite blocklength. The reason is that, once
the main channel quality suffices to guarantee λb > λe, a
larger α can improve the term lnλb−lnλe√
1−λ−2
b
in (28) which reflects
the channel superiority of the main channel over the wiretap
channel.
Define ξ , φ
−1−1
M−1 . Substituting α
∗ = 1 into (24) and (25)
yields the CDFs of γb and γe:
Fγb(γ) = 1− e−
γ
φΓb
M−1∑
k=0
1
k!
(
γ
φΓb
)k
, (29)
Fγe(γ) = 1− e−
γ
φΓe (1 + ξγ)
1−M
, (30)
3) Solving µ: The threshold µ(φ) = ρe(φ)Pb mentioned in
the last step is related to φ. This step further determines the
optimal µ∗ which is independent of φ and η. For tractability,
consider an asymptotically large blocklength and exploit the
tail property of the Q-function, then the information leakage
probability Oe is approximated as [32]
Oe(Φe) ≈ e−
Φe
φΓe (1 + ξΦe)
1−M
. (31)
Fig. 5 shows that the approximate Oe(Φe) is extremely close
to the exact value for quite a wide range of φ, M , n, and
Γe, and it then can be adopted to facilitate the subsequent
analysis and optimization. Revisiting ρe(φ) =
Φe(φ)
φ with
Oe(Φe(φ)) = δ, the following lemma is obtained.
Lemma 2 ([37]): ρe(φ) > 0,
dρe(φ)
dφ =
ρe(φ)
[1+φρe(φ)ξ]/Γe+1−φ > 0, and
d2ρe(φ)
dφ2 >
2
ρe(φ)
[
dρe(φ)
dφ
]2
> 0.
Lemma 2 indicates that ρe(φ) increases with φ. It is
observed from (27) that no positive Rs can be achieved if
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Fig. 5: Oe vs. φ for different M , n, and Γe.
Pbη ≤ ρe(0). To avoid this, the optimal on-off threshold
should be chosen as
µ∗ =
ρe(0)
Pb
. (32)
4) Solving n: This step gives the optimal blocklength n∗
that maximizes secrecy throughput.
Theorem 6: n∗ = N is optimal for maximizing TA in (26).
Proof 11: The proof is similar to that of Theorem 1. Accord-
ing to (53), one only needs to prove that fγe(τ
l
e) > fγe(τ
u
e ).
The PDF of γe is calculated from (30) and is given by
fγe(γ) =
(
1
φΓe (1 + ξγ)
M−1 +
ξ(M − 1)
(1 + ξγ)
M
)
e−
γ
φΓe . (33)
Apparently, fγe(γ) decreases with γ such that fγe(τ
l
e) >
fγe(τ
u
e ), which completes the proof.
Theorem 6 suggests that a multi-antenna transmitter also
should adopt the maximal blocklength to maximize the secrecy
throughput, regardless of the power allocation and code rates.
This is validated by Fig. 6, and the reason behind is similar
to that of the single-antenna case.
5) Solving φ: By now, the secrecy throughput TA(η) con-
ditioned on η is given by
TA(η) = Rs
(
1−Q
[√
Nλb
ln λbλe −Rs ln 2√
λ2b − 1
])
, (34)
where λb = 1 + φρb and λe = 1 + φρe with ρb > ρe.
For notational simplicity, φ has been dropped from ρe(φ).
Obviously, maximizing TA(η) is equivalent to maximizing the
following function:
L(φ) =
λb√
λ2b − 1
(
ln
λb
λe
−Rs ln 2
)
. (35)
Theorem 7: L(φ) in (35) is a concave function of φ, and
the optimal φ∗ maximizing L(φ) is
φ∗ =
{
1, η ≥ ρ◦bPb and
ρe(1)
1+ρe(1)
< 11+Γe ,
φ◦, otherwise.
f (36)
Here φ◦ is the unique zero-crossing φ ∈ [0, 1) of the following
derivative:
dL(φ)
dφ
=
(1−Aφ)λb − 1
φ
√
λ2b − 1
− (λb − 1) (lnλb −Bφ)
φ (λ2b − 1)3/2
, (37)
where Aφ ,
φ
λe
(
ρe + φ
dρe
dφ
)
and Bφ , lnλe + Rs ln 2 with
dρe
dφ given in Lemma 2, and ρ
◦
b is the unique root ρb of the
equation X(ρb) = 0 with X(ρb) given below:
X(ρb) = (1−A1)(1 + ρb)− 1− ln(1 + ρb)−B1
2 + ρb
. (38)
Proof 12: Please refer to Appendix F.
Theorem 7 shows that, the naive beamforming scheme
without injecting any AN is optimal for maximizing the
secrecy throughput only when the quality of the main channel
is good enough and meanwhile the quality of the wiretap
channel is poor or a high information leakage probability is
acceptable. Using the derivative rule for implicit functions with
(37) proves that dφ
∗
dRs
> 0, which suggests that in order to
support a higher secrecy rate, a larger fraction of power should
be allocated to the information signal although at the cost of
a larger required rate redundancy.
For a robust design perspective, a worst-case scenario is
considered by ignoring Eve’s thermal noise, i.e., Γe → ∞ in
(31), such that ρe =
Λ
1−φ with Λ = (M − 1)(δ
1
1−M − 1). It
is seen from (37) that φ∗ is a function of η and δ, and the
monotonicity of φ∗ is revealed as below.
Corollary 5: For the worst case Γe → ∞, the optimal
power allocation φ∗ is non-decreasing w.r.t. η and δ. Moreover,
limη→∞ φ∗ = 1√Λ+1 and limδ→1 φ
∗ = 1.
Proof 13: Please refer to Appendix G.
Corollary 5 suggests that when the quality of the main
channel improves (i.e., a larger η) or the secrecy requirement
is relaxed (i.e., a larger δ), it would be more appealing to
use a higher signal power to promote the main channel than
to increase the AN power to degrade the wiretap channel.
This is because that the main channel becomes the dominate
factor to the improvement of secrecy throughput. Different
from Theorem 7 where φ∗ = 1 can be achieved, the optimal φ∗
here only can be increased up to 1√
Λ+1
as η →∞ due to Eve’s
background noise being ignored. Besides, it is unsurprising
that φ∗ = 1 for δ = 1 since there is no secrecy requirement.
6) Solving Rs: For any given power allocation φ
∗, it can be
proved that the secrecy throughput TA(η) is a concave function
of the secrecy rate Rs as done in Theorem 2. Hence, the
optimal R∗s maximizing TA(η) is given by (12) and a closed-
form lower bound on R∗s can be found in (14). Eventually,
problem (26) can be addressed via an alternating optimization
(AO) method, which is summarized in Algorithm 1. In addi-
tion, at the high η regime, the optimal φ∗ is independent of
Rs, and hence a global optimal pair (φ
∗, R∗s) is obtained for
maximizing TA(η).
Fig. 6 illustrates the optimal power allocation φ∗ and the
corresponding maximal secrecy throughput TA(η) for varying
secrecy rate Rs. The maximal TA(η) is concave on Rs,
which guarantees the global optimality of the solution and
the convergence of the proposed AO algorithm. The optimal
10
Algorithm 1 AO Algorithm for Solving Problem (26)
1: Initialize k = 1, φ(0) ∈ [0, 1], R(0)s ≥ 0, and assign ǫ a
sufficiently small positive value, e.g., ǫ = 10−10;
2: Input δ ∈ [0, 1], N ≥ 1, and Pb,Γe, η = ‖hb‖2 > 0;
3: Calculate µ from (32) and T (0)A (η) = R(0)s p(0)s ;
4: if η < µ then
5: T (k)A (η)← 0;
6: else
7: Update φ(k) ← φ(k−1), R(k)s ← R(k−1)s ;
8: Calculate ρ◦b from (38);
9: if Pbη ≥ ρ◦b then
10: φ(k) ← 1;
11: else
12: Calculate φ(k) from (37);
13: end if
14: Calculate R
(k)
s from (12);
15: Update T (k)A (η)← R(k)s p(k)s ;
16: while
∣∣∣[T (k)A (η) − T (k−1)A (η)] /T (k−1)A (η)∣∣∣ ≥ ǫ do
17: Update k ← k + 1;
18: Repeat step 7 to step 15;
19: end while
20: end if
21: Output T (k)A (η)
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Fig. 6: Optimal φ∗ and TA(η) vs. Rs for different N and η, with M = 4,
Pb = 0 dB, Γe = 0 dB, and δ = 0.2.
φ∗ increases with η and Rs, which verifies Corollary 5. In
addition, the curves of φ∗ and TA(η) are truncated after Rs
exceeds some critical values. This can be explained similarly
as that of Fig. 2. It is shown that φ∗ increases with the
blocklength N , although slightly. This is because, increasing
N will mildly decrease the information leakage probability
Oe, thus allowing a larger portion of power to be devoted to
transmitting the information-bearing signal.
B. Non-Adaptive Optimization Scheme
This subsection examines the secrecy throughput maximiza-
tion through a non-adaptive design manner for the multi-
antenna transmitter case. The problem can be formulated as
max
µ,Re,Rs,n,α,φ
TN = Rsp¯s (39a)
s.t. (6b)− (6d), 0 ≤ α, φ ≤ 1, (39b)
where p¯s is the average successful decoding probability.
The basic idea to solve problem (39) is similar to that of
problem (15). Again, the optimal rate redundancy is R∗e =
O−1e (δ) withOe given in (4). For the adaptive case, it is known
from (27) that κ(γb(φ, 1), α) > κ(Φe(φ, 1), α)⇒ η > µ(φ) =
ρe(φ)
Pb
suffices to guarantee a positive secrecy rate Rs with
the threshold µ(φ) independent of α, and then α∗ = 1 is
optimal for secrecy throughput maximization. As for the non-
adaptive one, supporting a certain secrecy rate Rs requires that
1+κ(γb(φ, 1), α) > 2
Rs(1+κ(Φe(φ, 1), α)) which is further
transformed to
η > µ(φ) =
1
φPb
1
α
2Rs (1+κ(Φ∗e(φ,1),α))−1 − 1 + α
. (40)
Although µ(φ) herein depends on α, it is proved that µ(φ)
monotonically decreases with α. Hence, α∗ = 1 is still
throughput-optimal for the non-adaptive case. Accordingly, the
optimal threshold is µ∗ = 2
Rs (1+φρe)
φPb
. Similar to the proof
of Theorem 3, using the maximal blocklength is optimal for
maximizing secrecy throughput, regardless of the distribution
of γb. Hence, the optimal blocklength is n
∗ = N . Afterwards,
the secrecy throughput is calculated from (17):
TN = Rsp¯s = Rs
[
1− 1
2
Fγb(θ2b )−
β
θb
∫ τub
θ2b
Fγb(γ)dγ
]
(a)
= Rs
[
Γ¯(M,̺1)
2
+
φΓbβ
θb
∆Γ
]
, (41)
where (a) holds by invoking the CDF Fγb(γ) of
γb in (29) and computing the integral, with ∆Γ ,∑M−1
k=0
[
Γ¯(k + 1, ̺1)− Γ¯(k + 1, ̺2
]
) and Γ¯(m + 1, x) ,∑m
k=0
xke−x
k! being the regularized upper incomplete gamma
function, with ̺1 =
θ2b
φΓb
, ̺2 =
θ2b
φΓb
+ θb2βφΓb , θb =√
2Rs+R
∗
e − 1, and β =
√
N
2π . Differentiating TN w.r.t. φ yields
dTN
dφ
=Rs
[
̟1̺
M
1 e
−̺1
2(M − 1)! +
φΓbβ̟2∆Γ
θb
+ βθb̟1Γ(M,̺1)
−
(
βθb̟1 +
̟2
2
)
Γ¯(M,̺2)
]
, (42)
where ̟1 =
1
φ− 2
Rs
θ2b
dλe
dφ and ̟2 =
1
φ− 2
Rs
2θ2b
dλe
dφ with λe given
in (34). It is verified that the derivative dTNdφ is monotonically
decreasing with φ. In other words, for a fixed Rs, the optimal
φ∗ that maximizes TN is unique, which is φ∗ = 1 if dTNdφ |φ=1 >
0 or otherwise satisfies dTNdφ = 0. Likewise, it is confirmed that
the derivative
dTN
dRs
=
Γ¯(M,̺1)
2
+
φΓbβ
θb
∆Γ− λeRs2
Rs ln 2
θb
[
βΓ¯(M,̺1)
+
φΓbβ∆Γ
2θ2b
+
̺M1 e
−̺1
2θb(M − 1)! −
(
β +
1
4θb
)
Γ¯(M,̺2)
]
(43)
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Fig. 7: Above: R∗s and TN vs. φ; Bottom: φ
∗ and TN vs. Rs; for different
N and δ, with M = 4, Γb = 3 dB and Γe = 0 dB.
is first positive and then negative with increasing Rs, and the
unique optimal R∗s maximizing TN can be calculated via a
bisection method with the equation dTNdRs = 0.
The monotonicity of TN w.r.t. φ and Rs is verified in Fig.
7, where, similar to Fig. 6, TN is given with the optimal φ∗
or R∗s . This implies that the global maximal TN is practically
achieved even by alternatively solving the optimal φ and Rs.
As expected, TN improves with a larger blocklength N and a
looser secrecy constraint (a larger δ). It is found that R∗s first
increases and then might decrease with φ, which means that a
moderateRs is desired to balance the decoding and throughput
performance. On the other hand, a larger φ∗ is required to
support an increasing Rs. It is also shown that R
∗
s for a fixed
φ increases with N , since a larger N improves the decoding
performance which then affords a larger Rs. Nevertheless, φ
∗
decreases with N in the low Rs regime whereas increases with
N in the high Rs regime. It can be explained as follows: for
a low Rs, the rate redundancy Re has a great impact on the
decoding performance, and hence the AN power should be
increased as N increases to better combat the eavesdropper;
in contrast, for a large Rs, the decoding correctness is more
affected by the main channel quality, which requires a larger
signal power to maintain a high decoding probability.
Proposition 1: For the high average channel gain Γb →∞,
TN in (41) is approximated as
lim
Γb→∞
TN = Rs
(
1− ̺
M
1
2M !
)
. (44)
Proof 14: Please refer to Appendix H.
Proposition 1 shows that for a high average channel gain, the
secrecy throughput becomes independent of the blocklength.
In consequence, the optimal φ∗ and R∗s maximizing TN in
(44) admit the following closed-form approximations [21, (19),
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(20)]
lim
Γb→∞
φ∗ =
1√
Λ + 1
, (45)
lim
Γb→∞
R∗s =
1
M ln 2
[
W0
(
2 exp(1)M !ΓMb
(
√
Λ + 1)2M
)
− 1
]
. (46)
Fig. 8 illustrates the influence of the number of transmit
antennas M on the maximal secrecy throughput T ∗ for both
adaptive and non-adaptive schemes and the relative secrecy
throughput gain ∆T = T ∗A−T ∗NT ∗N . It is not surprising that
deploying more transmit antennas can significantly improve
the secrecy throughput for both schemes. Similar to the
observation in Fig. 4, both T ∗A and T ∗N increase with δ and N ,
but the benefit to T ∗N brought by a largerN is nearly negligible.
The right-hand-side subgraph shows that ∆T drops sharply as
M increases but grows for a larger N and a smaller δ. This
indicates that the superiority of the adaptive scheme over its
non-adaptive counterpart is more pronounced for the scenarios
requiring a large blocklengh, having few transmit antennas,
suffering from a stringent secrecy constraint, etc; otherwise,
the non-adaptive scheme might be appealing because of the
low-complexity off-line design.
C. A Note on Multi-Antenna Eve
This subsection examines the secure transmission in the
presence of an Eve with Me antennas. Assume that Eve
employs the minimum mean-squared error (MMSE) receiver,
and then the CDF of Eve’s SINR under the null-space AN
scheme can be given as [23]:
Fγe(x) = 1− e−
x
φPe
Me∑
n=1
An(x)
(n− 1)!
(
x
φPe
)n−1
, (47)
where
An(x) =
{
1, Me ≥M − 1 + n,
∑Me−n
m=0 (
M−1
m )(ξx)
m
(1+ξx)M−1 , Me < M − 1 + n.
(48)
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The information leakage probability Oe is obtained by sub-
stituting (47) into (50), and the secrecy throughput can be
optimized similarly as described in the above two subsections.
By ignoring the receiver noise at Eve, i.e., considering Eve’s
transmit power Pe →∞, one can obtain Fγe(x) = 1−A1(x).
Furthermore, if Eve has more antennas than Alice, i.e., Me ≥
M , one have A1(x) = 1, Fγe(x) = 0, and accordingly
Oe = 1. This means, when Pe → ∞, Eve with enough
antennas can completely eliminate all the AN signals with an
MMSE receiver such that her SNR will approach infinity. As
a consequence, the SOP constraint can no longer be satisfied
for any chosen rate redundancy, and no positive secrecy rate
can be achieved from the perspective of secrecy outage. In
other words, the null-space AN scheme can safeguard secure
transmissions well for the finite blocklength regime only when
the eavesdropper has fewer antennas than the transmitter, and
this conclusion is the same as that for the infinite blocklength
case.
V. CONCLUSIONS
This paper investigated the design of secure transmissions
in slow fading channels, where secrecy encoding with finite
blocklength was employed to confront the eavesdropper. Both
adaptive and non-adaptive schemes were devised to maximize
the secrecy throughput, providing the optimal threshold of the
on-off transmission policy, blocklength, code rates, and power
allocation of the AN scheme. Theoretical and numerical
results showed that, under the on-off policy, increasing the
blocklength can simultaneously enhance the reliability and
secrecy, and thus the secrecy throughput is maximized when
using the maximal blocklength. In addition, since an overly
large secrecy rate will significantly decrease the successful
decoding probability thus lowering the secrecy throughput,
there exists a critical secrecy rate, but not as large as possible,
that can achieve the maximal secrecy throughput.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Lemma 1
For tractability, a piece-wise linear approximation approach
is leveraged to approximate the Q-function given in (2), i.e.,
Q
(
Ci−Ri√
Vi/n
)
≈ Ξ(γi, n, Ri) for i ∈ {b, e} [31], [32],3 with
Ξ(γi, n, Ri) =


0, γi > τ
u
i ,
1
2 − βθi (γi − θ2i ), τ li ≤ γi ≤ τui ,
1, γi < τ
l
i ,
(49)
where β ,
√
n
2π , θi ,
√
2Ri − 1, τui , θ2i + θi2β , and τ li ,
θ2i − θi2β .4 With (49), the information leakage probability Oe
defined in (4) is calculated as
Oe = 1− Eγe [Ξ(γe, n, Re)] = 1−
β
θe
∫ τue
τ le
Fγe(γ)dγ, (50)
3 This approximation has been extensively applied to the finite-blocklength
scenarios, and its accuracy has been well validated.
4Generally, θi >
1
2β
or Ri > log2
(
1 + pi2/n
)
should be satisfied to
ensure a positive τ li .
where Fγi(γ) = 1 − e−γ/Γ
2
i is the CDF of γi for i ∈ {b, e},
and the last equality in (50) follows from invoking (49) and
using partial integration. Next, treat n as a continuous variable.
As R∗e satisfies Oe(R∗e) = δ, the derivative dR
∗
e
dn is obtained
by using the derivative rule for implicit functions [22] with
Oe(R∗e) = δ, i.e.:
dR∗e
dn
= − ∂Oe/∂n
∂Oe/∂R∗e
. (51)
First, it can be proved that ∂Oe∂R∗e =
∂Oe
∂θe
∂θe
∂R∗e
< 0 by noting that
∂θe
∂R∗e
> 0 and
∂Oe
∂θe
=
β
θ2e
∫ τue
τ le
Fγe(γ)dγ −
β
θe
[
dτue
dθe
Fγe(τue )−
dτ le
dθe
Fγe(τ le)
]
(a)
≤ β
θ2e
[γFγe(γ)] |τ
u
e
τ le
− 4βθe + 1
2θe
Fγe(τue ) +
4βθe − 1
2θe
Fγe(τ le)
= β
[Fγe(τ le)−Fγe(τue )] < 0,
where (a) follows from the partial integration. The next step is
to determine the sign of ∂Oe∂n =
∂Oe
∂β
∂β
∂n . The first and second
derivatives of Oe w.r.t. β are respectively given by
∂Oe
∂β
=
1
2β
[Fγe(τue ) + Fγe(τ le)]− 1θe
∫ τue
τ le
Fγe(γ)dγ,
(52)
∂2Oe
∂β2
=
θe
4β3
[
fγe(τ
l
e)− fγe(τue )
]
. (53)
It is easy to see ∂
2Oe
∂β2 > 0 as fγe(γ) =
1
Γe
e−γ/Γe decreases
with γ and τue > τ
l
e. This indicates that
∂Oe
∂β increases with
β such that ∂Oe∂β <
∂Oe
∂β |β→∞ = 0. Combining ∂Oe∂β < 0 and
∂β
∂n > 0 yields
∂Oe
∂n < 0. With
∂Oe
∂R∗e
< 0 and ∂Oe∂n < 0 in (51),
dR∗e
dn < 0 is obtained, which completes the proof.
B. Proof of Theorem 1
The derivative of ps w.r.t. n is given by
dps
dn
=
1√
2π
e
−n(Cb−Rt)
2
2Vb
[
Cb −Rt
2
√
nVb
−
√
n
Vb
dR∗e
dn
]
, (54)
which follows from the derivative
dQ(x)
dx =
−1√
2π
e−
x2
2 . Plug-
ging
dR∗e
dn < 0, as shown in Lemma 1, into (54) yields
dps
dn > 0.
For a fixed Rs in (10), it is directly concluded that
dTA(η)
dn > 0,
which means that TA(η) monotonically increases with n. Since
n is an integer, TA(η) is maximized at the maximal integer of
n, i.e., n = N , which completes the proof.
C. Proof of Theorem 2
From (13), it is easy to prove that
d2TA(η)
dR2s
< 0, i.e.,
TA(η) is concave on Rs. It is verified that dTA(η)dRs |Rs=0 =
1 − Q
(
Cb−R∗e√
Vb/N
)
> 0. As a result, TA(η) is maximized
at the boundary Rs = Cb − R∗e if dTA(η)dRs |Rs=Cb−R∗e =
1
2 − Cb−R
∗
e√
2πVb/N
≥ 0 ⇒ R∗e ≥ Cb −
√
πVb
2N or otherwise at the
unique zero-crossing of
dTA(η)
dRs
, i.e., R◦s . Next, the condition
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R∗e ≥ Cb −
√
πVb
2N is equivalently transformed to that γb does
not exceed a critical value γ◦b . Let ψ(γb) = Cb −
√
πVb
2N . It
can be readily confirmed that ψ(γb) < 0, and ψ(γb) decreases
with γb if 0 < γb < γ
L
b ,
√
1
2 +
√
1
4 +
π
2N − 1 or otherwise
increases with γb. This leads to R
∗
e ≥ ψ(γb) ⇒ γb ≤ γ◦b ,
ψ−1(R∗e). An upper bound for γ
◦
b is further provided by
realizing that ψ(γ◦b ) = R
∗
e > log2(1 + γ
◦
b ) −
√
π
2N log2 e ⇒
γ◦b < γ
U
b , e
√
pi
2N+R
∗
e ln 2 − 1. Then, γ◦b can be quickly
calculated using the bisection method with ψ(γb) = R
∗
e in
the range (γLb , γ
U
b ). This completes the proof.
D. Proof of Theorem 4
First, display the derivative
dY (θb)
dθb
in a recursive form
dY (θb)
dθb
= 1θb −
(
1
θb
+ 12βΓb
)
Y (θb) with Y (θb) in (20). Then,
the derivative dTNdθb is given by
dTN
dθb
= θb
1+θ2b
e
− θ
2
b
ΓbG(θb), with
G(θb) presented in (21). It is easily proved that G(θb) > 0
when θb =
√
2R
∗
e − 1 and G(θb) < 0 as θb → ∞. The
key step of the proof is to argue that G(θb) monotonically
decreases with θb, which guarantees a unique zero-crossing of
G(θb) within θb ∈ (
√
2R
∗
e − 1,∞). In other words, TN initially
increases and then decreases with θb and reaches the maximum
when θb arrives at the unique zero-crossing of G(θb). To this
end, it is necessary to calculate the derivative
dG(θb)
dθb
:
dG(θb)
dθb
=
dY (θb)
dθb
− 2g(θb)
ln 2
− [log2(1 + θ2b )−R∗e]h(θb),
(55)
where h(θb) =
(
1− 1
θ2b
)
g(θb) +
1+θ2b
θb
dg(θb)
dθb
. To proceed, the
following lemma is introduced.
Lemma 3: Y (θb) decreases with θb and satisfies
2βΓb
θb + 2βΓb
< Y (θb) < min
{
1,
2βΓb
θb
}
. (56)
Proof 15: Define x , θb2βΓb such that Y (θb) =
1−e−x
x .
The monotonicity of Y (θb) w.r.t. θb is due to
dY (θb)
dθb
=
(1+x)e−x−1
x < 0. The lower bound of Y (θb) is obtained from
dY (θb)
dθb
= 1θb −
(
1
θb
+ 12βΓb
)
Y (θb) < 0 and the upper bound
follows from Y (θb) <
1
x and 1− e−x < x.
With the lower bound of Y (θb) given in (56), it can be read-
ily proved that g(θb) > 0 such that the term
dY (θb)
dθb
− 2g(θb)
in (55) is negative. Besides, since h(θb) ≥ 0 directly yields
dG(θb)
dθb
< 0, one only needs to discuss the situation h(θb) < 0
and prove that
dG(θb)
dθb
ln 2 ≤ dY (θb)
dθb
− 2g(θb)− h(θb) ln(1 + θ2b )
(a)
<
dY (θb)
dθb
− 2g(θb)− θ2bh(θb)
(b)
≤ − 1
θb + 2βΓb
(
θ2b
Γb
+
θ4b
Γb
+ 8βθb + 8βθ
3
b − θ2b
)
(c)
< 0, (57)
where (a) is due to ln(1 + x) ≤ x, (b) holds by invoking
Lemma 3 along with algebraic manipulations, and (c) derives
from 8βθb + 8βθ
3
b ≥ 16βθ2b > θ2b as β =
√
N
2π >
1
8 .
E. Proof of Theorem 5
First fix Rs, and it is clear that the term
−λbRs√
λ2b−1
in (28)
increases with α as λb increases with α. It is also verified that
the term Z(α) , λb(lnλb−lnλe)√
λ2b−1
in (28) increases with α by
computing the derivative of Z(α) w.r.t. α:
dZ(α)
dα
=
dλb
dα
(
λ2b − 1− ln λbλe
)
− λb(λ2b−1)λe dλedα
(λ2b − 1)3/2
(a)
=
λb(λb − 1)
[
(λb − λe)(λb + 1)− ln λbλe
]
α(λ2b − 1)3/2
(b)
≥
λb(λb − 1)(λb − λe)
(
λb + 1− 1λe
)
α(λ2b − 1)3/2
(c)
> 0, (58)
where (a) holds by substituting dλidα =
λi(λi−1)
α for i ∈ {b, e},
(b) follows from the inequality ln λbλe ≤ λb−λeλe with λb >
λe > 0, and (c) is due to λb > λe > 1. Hence, ps in (28)
increases with α as Q(x) decreases with x. This indicates,
α∗ = 1 is optimal for maximizing TA(η) = Rsps for any
given Rs and η and is also optimal for maximizing TA.
F. Proof of Theorem 7
Let L(φ) = L1L2, where L1 =
λb√
λ2b−1
and L2 =
ln λbλe −Rs ln 2 such that dL1dφ = −ρb(L21 − 1)3/2 and dL2dφ =
ρb
λb
− ρe+φ
dρe
dφ
λe
. Rewrite the second derivative as
d2L(φ)
dφ2 =
L1(L
2
1 − 1)2I(φ) with I(φ) given by (59) at the top of this
page, where (a) holds by recalling the definition L2 ≤ ln λbλe
and invoking the result d
2ρe
dφ2 >
2
ρe
(
dρe
dφ
)2
> 0 from Lemma 2,
(b) follows from plugging L1 =
λb√
λ2
b
−1 , using the inequality
ln λbλe ≤ λb−λeλe , and omitting the term (φ2 +
2φ
ρe
)(dρedφ )
2,
(c) holds by substituting dL2dφ into (b), and (d) is estab-
lished after some manipulation operations and by discarding
the negative term
2(λ2b−1)
λbλ2e
[
φρbλe − λb
(
λ2b − 1
)]
noting that
λb = 1 + φρb > λe. As indicated by (59) that L(φ) is
concave on φ, L(φ) is maximized at φ = 1 if dL(φ)dφ |φ=1 ≥ 0
or otherwise at the unique zero-crossing of
dL(φ)
dφ . Besides,
dL(φ)
dφ |φ=1 ≥ 0 is equivalent to X(ρb) ≥ 0 in (38). Clearly,
A1 =
(1+Γe)ρe(1)
1+ρe(1)
< 1 must be ensured to yield a positive
X(ρb), with which it can be verified that X(ρb) increases with
ρb. As a consequence,
dL(φ)
dφ |φ=1 ≥ 0 can be transformed to
an explicit form with relation to ρb, namely, ρb ≥ ρ◦b . This
completes the proof.
G. Proof of Corollary 5
Let K(φ) denote dL(φ)dφ in (37). It is verified that
dφ∗
dη =
− ∂K(φ)/∂η∂K(φ)/∂φ |φ=φ∗ > 0 by recalling that ∂K(φ)∂φ |φ=φ∗ < 0 from
14
I(φ) = 3ρ2bL2 −
2ρb
dL2
dφ
L1(L21 − 1)1/2
− 1
(L21 − 1)2

ρ2b
λ2b
+
2 dρedφ + (φ+ φ
2ρe)
d2ρe
dφ2 − ρ2e − φ2(dρedφ )2
λ2e


(a)
≤ 3ρ2b ln
λb
λe
− 2ρb
L1
√
L21 − 1
dL2
dφ
− 1
(L21 − 1)2
[
ρ2b
λ2b
+
2 dρedφ + (φ
2 + 2φρe )(
dρe
dφ )
2 − ρ2e
λ2e
]
(b)
≤
[
3ρ2b
λb − λe
λe
− 2ρbλ
2
b − 1
λb
dL2
dφ
− (λ2b − 1)2
(
ρ2b
λ2b
+
2 dρedφ − ρ2e
λ2e
)]
(c)
=
ρ2b
[
3λ2b(λb − λe) + λe(1− λ4b)
]
λ2bλe
+
2ρb(λ
2
b − 1)
λbλe
(
ρe + φ
dρe
dφ
)
+
(λ2b − 1)2
λ2e
(
ρ2e − 2
dρe
dφ
)
(d)
≤ −φρ
2
b(ρb − ρe)
λ2bλ
2
e
[
2φ4ρ3bρe + φ
3ρ2b(ρb + 6ρe) + φ
2ρb(ρb + 8ρe) + 5φρe + 1
]
< 0, (59)
Theorem 7 and proving that
∂K(φ)
∂ρb
|φ=φ∗ =
λ2b−λb+1
λb
− (1−Aφ∗) + (2λb−1)(lnλb−Bφ∗ )λb+1
φ∗(λ2b − 1)5/2/Pb
(a)
=
1
λb
− λb + (2λ2b − λb − 1)(1−Aφ∗)
φ∗(λ2b − 1)5/2/Pb
(b)
≥ λb − 1
φ∗(λ2b − 1)5/2/Pb
> 0, (60)
where (a) is due to
lnλb−Bφ∗
λb+1
= (1−Aφ∗)λb − 1 from
K(φ∗) = 0, and (b) is because (1 − Aφ∗)λb − 1 > 0.
Moreover, limη→∞K(φ∗) =
1−Aφ∗
φ∗ . Solving K(φ
∗) = 0
with Aφ∗ =
φ∗Λ
(1−φ∗)(1−φ∗+φ∗Λ) yields φ
∗ = 1√
Λ+1
. Similarly,
one can prove that dφ
∗
dΛ < 0⇒ dφ
∗
dδ > 0 and limδ→1 φ
∗ = 1.
H. Proof of Proposition 1
Note that ̺1, ̺2 → 0 as Γb → ∞. Resorting to [21, Eqn.
(44)] yields
Γ¯(M,̺i) = e
−̺i
M−1∑
k=0
̺ki
k!
≈ 1− ̺
M
i
M !
, i ∈ {1, 2}, (61)
and the term ∆Γ in (41) is approximated as
∆Γ =
M−1∑
k=0
[
Γ¯(k + 1, ̺1)− Γ¯(k + 1, ̺2)
]
=
M−1∑
k=0
(
e−̺1
k∑
m=0
̺m1
m!
− e−̺2
k∑
m=0
̺m2
m!
)
=
M−1∑
k=0
M − k
k!
(
e−̺1̺k1 − e−̺2̺k2
)
= M∆Γ(M − 1, ̺1, ̺2)− ̺1Γ¯(M − 1, ̺1) + ̺2Γ¯(M − 1, ̺2)
≈M
(
̺M1
M !
− ̺
M
2
M !
)
−
[
̺1 − ̺
M
1
(M − 1)!
]
+
[
̺2 − ̺
M
2
(M − 1)!
]
= ̺2 − ̺1 = θb
2βφΓb
. (62)
Substituting (61) and (62) into (41) completes the proof.
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